This study investigates competition between health insurance companies under different financing regulations. We consider two alternatives advanced in recent German healthcare reform discussions: competition by contribution rates (health contributions) and by fees (health premia). We find that contribution rate competition yields lower company profits and higher consumer welfare than premia competition when switching between insurance companies is costly.
INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, most European countries have experienced an intensive debate about suitable strategies for cost containment in public health care. Germany delivers a showcase in this respect, not least because its health care system uses comparatively much resources to produce only average results in international comparison (OECD, 2008) . Hence, eradicating inefficiencies from the system seems a promising route to cope with the ever-growing budgetary pressure due to demographic change and medical progress. Fehr and Jess (2006) and Richter (2009) provide informative surveys on the debate in Germany.
From an economic perspective, the promotion of competition suggests itself as a solution here. In fact, many advisors perceive the problems of health insurance as problems of an uncompetitive environment, and consequently argue in favor of a strengthening of market forcessee Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundesministerium der Finanzen (2004) and OECD (2008) as characteristic examples for that view.
Income-dependent contributions to health insurance are commonly viewed as an obstacle to the workings of free markets. Therefore, the proposal to enhance competition is often accompanied by the suggestion to replace income-related contributions by uniform fees, so-called health premia. It is frequently argued that the concomitant removal of income redistribution from health insurance would kill two birds with one stone: first, both the excess burden of the implicit income tax and the overconsumption of health services due to distorted price signals would be removed. Second, competition between insurance companies would intensify and customer expenditures would be lower because insurants faced stronger incentives to switch to more advantageous contracts (Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 2004; OECD, 2008) . This view has been followed in the recent major reforms in Switzerland and the Netherlands, two often considered role models for German health insurance (Gress et al., 2007; Richter, 2009) .
While the first part of this argument has been discussed thoroughly in the literature, the finding being mixed once compensation for the income losses of poorer households is accounted for (Breyer and Haufler, 2000; Buchholz, 2005; Fehr and Jess, 2006; Schubert and Schnabel, 2009) , its second part is often alluded to (Buchholz, 2005; Fehr and Jess, 2006; Richter, 2009 ), but goes virtually unexamined. To the best of our knowledge, there is no theoretical analysis of the competitive virtues of contribution/tax rates versus user fees; neither in the healthcare context nor from a general perspective. The existing literature on the choice of taxes versus fees focusses entirely on political economy aspects and/or the provision of public goods without touching on issues of competition (Bös, 1980; Fraser, 1996; Swope and Janeba, 2005) . This is also true for Kifmann (2005) who discusses the political economy of income-related contributions in the realm of healthcare. Vaithianathan (2006) discusses interactions between health insurance and healthcare markets, allowing for imperfect competition in the latter. However, health insurance is assumed to be perfectly competitive and any role of its mode of financing is blurred as all households have identical incomes.
On the empirical side, Cutler and Reber (1998) identify a substantial competition effect from a shift from income-related to uniform health plan employer subsidies for Harvard University employees. However, they do not delve into a detailed analysis of strategic interactions in pricing decisions between insurance companies. Moreover, the applicability of their findings is limited by the imperfect analogy between removing income-related subsidies and removing incomerelated contributions. In a recent study, Frank and Lamiraud (2009) challenge the above-mentioned claim that competition necessarily improves consumer choice in health insurance. For Switzerland, they find persistent price differences and weak switching to cheaper insurance plans. However, they do not address the question to what extent switching decisions are affected by financing mechanisms. For the Netherlands, Gress et al. (2007) find evidence that customer mobility is rather a short-term phenomenon.
This gap in the literature is somewhat surprising, as it is far from obvious that the implementation of health premia is a prerequisite for competition. Competition by contribution rates is equally conceivable and has to some extent been allowed in Germany before.
The present study is a first attempt to address this gap. In a simple stylized duopoly model, we examine how consumers fare when insurance companies compete by setting either health contributions proportional to income or uniform health premia. Interestingly, our plain analysis does not provide support for the competition argument for financing health insurance by premia. Whereas the question of premia versus contribution competition turns out to be virtually irrelevant when customers are infinitely reactive to price differentials, contribution rate competition leads to lower aggregate health insurance expenditures and hence higher consumer welfare when demand inertia is considered. This result is grounded in the fact that contribution rate competition renders richer individuals the favorite customers of insurance companies, as they pay higher prices for medical insurance. However, by the same token, richer people react also more sensitively to contribution rate differentials than poorer people. The attempt to attract high-income persons induces a strong incentive for insurance companies to mitigate contribution rates.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic structure of the model. Section 3 analyzes both premia and contribution rate competition with an infinitely reactive demand, whereas Section 4 considers demand inertia with consumers reacting sluggishly on price differentials. Section 5 provides some extensions and Section 6 concludes.
THE MODEL
Consider an economy populated by a large number of individuals with total mass of one. Persons differ with respect to gross income according to an income distribution characterized by the p.d.f. f(y) with support [y,y]. Let l ¼ R y y yf ðyÞdy denote mean (=aggregate) income, while r 2 is the variance. These variables determine the squared coefficient of variation of the income distribution: svc ¼ r 2 =l 2 .
Each individual faces a risk of illness p, in which case a damage c arises. To start with, we assume that this risk is the same for every person, that is, it is uncorrelated to income. This assumption will be relaxed in the Extensions Section.
There are two health insurance companies A and B which compete for their customers either by setting health premia p i or health contribution rates s i with i ∈ {A,B}. In accordance with important characteristics of German, Swiss and Dutch insurance schemes, we posit that insurance is compulsory for all persons and that there is open enrolment, that is, insurance providers have to accept every customer. Moreover, state authorities prescribe the extent of treatment in case of illness. As a useful benchmark, we stipulate that the treatment has to compensate for the whole personal damage. To simplify the exposition, the respective cost is assumed to amount to c as well.
Due to these features, all individuals are fully insured and insurance companies face total treatment expenditures of p·c. Consequently, the sum of consumer expenditures and producer profits in the health insurance market amounts to total treatment cost Àp·c, irrespective of contribution rate or fee levels. Hence, every equilibrium in the health insurance market is Pareto-efficient: it is impossible to improve the situation of any market participant without harming another. However, these equilibria differ in terms of the division of gains between insurers and insured on the one hand and the insured on the other hand. In the following analysis, we address both dimensions by considering two separate indicators: consumer expenditures, the total payments by the insured and consumer welfare, the sum of resulting individual utilities. More precise definitions of the measures follow below.
COMPETITION WITH PERFECTLY REACTIVE CUSTOMERS
the slightest utility gain. We start with the case of premia competition, then turn to contribution rate competition and finally compare the equilibria.
Health Premia
Suppose that both insurance companies offer full insurance in exchange for premia p A and p B , respectively. Then, the expected utility of a person with income y choosing company i is:
where u(·) is the strictly concave individual utility function.
As the benefits in case of illness are regulated to be equal for both companies, preferences over both offers are determined by cost considerations: the individual chooses A over B with certainty when p A \ p B and vice versa. For equal premia, the person is indifferent.
To simplify the exposition, we abstract from any problems arising from negative incomes due to health premia exceeding personal gross income. This works in favor of premia.
Hence, depending on the levels of the premia, the share of people with income y choosing company ii's market share in income group ycan be described by:
where p ¼ ðp A ; p B Þ is the vector of premia and j 6 ¼ i denotes the competing company. Then, the profits for insurance company i are:
which leads to the Bertrand-type symmetric equilibrium
This result is due to the infinitely high reactiveness of customers. Because all insured switch to the cheaper company, each insurer has a strong incentive to undercut the competitor whenever this still allows to cover the expected treatment cost. Competition drives premia down to expected treatment cost and all profits are eliminated.
Contribution Rates
When health insurance is funded by income-related contribution rates, an individual with income y contracting with company i experiences utility: uðð1 À s i ÞyÞ:
It is straightforward that each individual chooses the company with the lower rate whenever it exists and is indifferent otherwise. As a consequence, the share of persons with income y opting for company i is given by:
;
with s ¼ ðs A ; s B Þ as the vector of contribution rates. Profits are:
Again, the fierce competition drives profits down to zero in the symmetric equilibrium:
No situation with positive profits for a company can constitute an equilibrium as the competitor would have an incentive to capture total demand by offering a marginally lower contribution rate.
Comparing Equilibria
We are now in the position to compare the resulting equilibria. As mentioned above, two measures are used: consumer expenditures CE and consumer welfare CW. The first measure CE is concerned with the division of the surplus between insurants and insurers. Since consumer expenditures and company profits always add up to Àp·c, consumer expenditures equal company revenues. Hence we have:
for premia and contribution rates, respectively. Consumer welfare CW, however, explicitly considers the distribution of consumer expenditures among individuals. Focussing on a utilitarian formulation for convenience, we have:
Proposition 1. With perfect customer mobility, health premia and health contribution rates competition yield identical results in terms of total consumer expenditures. However, consumer welfare is higher with health contributions.
Proof. The first statement follows immediately from the fact that company profits are zero in both equilibria. Hence, revenues must be same and so have to be total consumer expenditures. The distribution of these expenditures among households is uniform for premia competition and progressive for contribution rate competition. With diminishing marginal utility of income, the sum of utilities is higher under contribution rate competition. As a first outcome, we find that the current set-up does not deliver an argument in favor of premia rather than contribution rates competition. Both types of competition impose the same total cost on the insured, while contribution rates are preferable from a distributional perspective. However, this preference is merely grounded in the fact that no other instruments for income redistribution are at hand. In particular, we have omitted any compensation for low-income A. Kemnitz groups, which are a feature of every real-world premia proposal. In general, utilizing an additional income tax would allow fee competition to reproduce the level of consumer welfare achieved with contribution rate competition. In that case, the mode of competition would be irrelevant for all market participants and hence for society. However, note that the tax rate would have to be income-dependent to achieve the same allocation as with health contribution rates.
COMPETITION WITH DEMAND INERTIA
It is well known that immediate switching serves rather as a useful theoretical benchmark than as a good description of actual customer behavior. Instead, substantial price differences seem to go hand in hand with a low intensity of changing providerssee Frank and Lamiraud (2009) for respective evidence for the Swiss Health Care System. Therefore, we revisit the issue of fee and contribution rate competition in a setting where consumers are imperfectly reactive to price differentials. For this purpose, we introduce demand inertia to the analysis. We assume now that individuals differ not only with respect to income but also along a second dimension, which we label switching cost. We understand this as the generic term for the numerous reasons for demand inertia like customer loyalty, searching and learningsee Dubé et al. (2010) for a comparison of these three alternatives.
An important point is to what extent the switching cost distribution is income-dependent. From a theoretical perspective, arguments can be made both for a positive and a negative correlation between these two variables. On the one hand, high-income individuals may have higher opportunity (time) costs from searching for alternative products. On the other hand, they may also face lower barriers to collect information, for example because of better access to the internet.
Unfortunately, the growing literature on switching in health insurance markets (Dormont et al., 2009; Handel, 2011) does not address the impact of household income. However, there is some evidence for other goods. In her study on deposit account holders in the United States, Kiser (2002) finds a U-shaped relation between household income and switching cost. Also, Giulietti et al. (2005) find for UK gas supply that households with higher income are more likely to switch than households with lower income. In the light of these ambiguities, we base the following analysis on the premise that the distributions of switching costs and income are uncorrelated.
To fix ideas, define k as the cost arising from company B instead of company A and take it to be distributed in the interval À k; k Â Ã ; k ! 0 for each income level according to the distribution function l(k) and cumulative distribution function L(k). We assume that l(k) is symmetric around the zero mean: l(k) = l(Àk) and L (0) = 1/2. These properties imply that one half of individuals would incur a cost from changing from A to B and vice versa, all other things equal. This depicts a situation where both companies share the market equally before competition is introduced. For convenience, let l(k) have positive mass over the whole support: l(k) > 0 for all k 2 À k; k Â Ã , and let z = l(0) denote the share of households with zero switching cost. Accordingly, changing the insurance company is costly for the remaining share 1 À z of the population.
We would like to emphasize that this formulation bears some resemblance to Klemperer (1987) , analyzing the effects of switching costs on market outcomes. However, Klemperer (1987) considers a two-stage game where firms try to capture customers in the first period to create switching costs and hence demand inertia in the second stage. Due to the uncompetitiveness of health insurance before the recent reforms, we omit such strategic considerations in our model.
Health Premia
With health premia, switching costs matter for demand in the following way. A person with income y chooses insurer A when uðy À p A þ kÞ [ uðy À p B Þ, which is tantamount to:
that is, his cost from leaving A is stronger than the premium differential. Accounting for the support of the cost distribution, we arrive at the following expression for A's market share among people with income y:
whereasd P B ðy; pÞ ¼ 1 Àd P A ðy; pÞ. The profit of company i is given by: Z y y ½p i À p Á cd P i ðy; pÞf ðyÞdy:
Maximizing this expression with respect to p i yields the first-order condition: Z y yd P i ðy; pÞf ðyÞdy þ Z y y ½p i À p Á c @d P i ðy; pÞ @p i f ðyÞdy ¼ 0;
and assume that the second-order condition:
is fulfilled. Ultimately, this is an assumption on the switching cost distribution
We therefore restrict our attention to those distributions for which (11) holds.
Moreover, we concentrate on symmetric equilibria. Premia being strategic complements, the reaction curves have positive slope in the premia space and are symmetric. Hence, any intersection of these curves must lie on the angle bisector.
Proposition 2. In the symmetric premia competition equilibrium with switching costs, premia equal a markup on expected treatment cost which depends positively on the share of households with switching costs:
Proof. In the symmetric equilibrium, we haved P i ðy; pÞ ¼ 1=2 and @d P i ðy;pÞ @p i ¼ Àz. Using these expressions in (10) gives:
As R y y f ðyÞdy ¼ 1, that condition becomes: 1=2 À ðp i À p Á cÞz ¼ 0, which is solved by (12).
Condition (10) shows the tradeoff between positive and negative marginal effects of raising the premium. The positive effectcalled extraction effect in the sequelaccrues because higher premia generate more revenue from the customers. The negative erosion effect is the reduction in profits due to the loss of customers. This erosion effect is the stronger, the more reactive demand is, that is, the less people bear a cost of changing the company. Thus, equilibrium premia depend negatively on za finding analogous to Klemperer (1987) .
Contribution Rates
Consider now the case where insurance companies compete by health contribution rates. The preference of a person with income y of A over B is now reflected by the condition:
As above, A is preferred by everyone whose switching cost exceeds the threshold being equal to his difference in health insurance expenditures. However, this difference varies among people as it depends on personal gross income. Payments being proportional to income, any given contribution rate differential affects high income earners stronger than low income earners.
From (14), the share of people with income y opting for company A becomes:d R A ðy; sÞ ¼
1
:
Inspection of (15) shows that this market share is income-dependent for moderate contribution rate differentials: Among people with equal income, the proportion choosing A decreases in y when s A [ s B and increases when s A \s B . Intuitively, the higher the income, the higher the financial sacrifice of choosing the more expensive provider and hence the lower the attachment toward that company.
As a consequence, the responsiveness to contribution rate changes depends on income:
Interestingly, the effect of increasing s A is not unambiguous in general: on the one hand, for any given threshold, the share of people leaving A is the higher, the higher their income level is. On the other hand, the switching cost threshold increases with income as well. Thus, depending on the sign of l 0 ðÁÞ, the mass of people at this higher threshold can increase or decrease, the latter case tending to diminish the demand reaction for higher income strata. This case is relevant because the symmetry of l(k) implies that the distribution of switching costs must be both increasing and decreasing across the support ðl 0 ðkÞ ¼ Àl 0 ðÀkÞÞ, unless the distribution is uniform (lðkÞ ¼ 1=ð2 kÞ; l 0 ðkÞ ¼ 0). This creates a basic ambiguity. Nevertheless, a clear-cut result obtains when contribution rates are equal ðs A ¼ s B Þ. Then, the switching cost threshold is zero and thus independent of income and hence the above mass effect vanishes. Consequently, richer people are definitely more responsive to contribution rate increases, at least when rates do not differ too much:
@ 2dR
A ðy; sÞ @s A @y
Taking the behavior of customers into account, companies maximize: with equality when (17) is positive. This expression can be interpreted analogous to (10). The first term denotes the positive extraction effect, the higher revenue generated from the customer base. The second term measures the erosion effect, that is the reduction in profits due to the reduction in the customer base. Obviously, the profit reduction can be decomposed in the reduction in revenue and cost, respectively.
Proposition 3. With switching costs, equilibrium contribution rates are a positive markup on the ratio of expected treatment cost to average income if income inequality is sufficiently low. Otherwise, the markup is zero. 
Because the second moment of the income distribution equals the sum of the variance and the squared mean:
(20) can be written as:
However, (22) renders (17) negative whenever svc>1/(2·z·p·c). In that case,
Affecting both the extraction and the erosion effect, the income distribution becomes contentious for equilibrium contribution rates. The extraction effect is proportional to average income because a marginal increase in the contribution rate collects a infinitesimally higher income share from all customers. The erosion effect is influenced by the higher sensitivity of richer people to contribution rate increases and can be disentangled into impacts on revenue and cost. On the one hand, the cost savings due to the shrinking number of customers are proportional to average income in our set-up. On the other hand, the loss in revenues is more than proportional because not only the reduction in the customer base but also the revenues per insurant increase in income. That's why the second moment of the income distribution and hence the squared coefficient of variation come into play. As an increase in that coefficient increases the relative strength of the revenue component of the erosion effect, contribution rates are driven down to a zero-profit equilibrium when income inequality is sufficiently high.
Comparing Equilibria
How do the two equilibria compare regarding consumer expenditures and consumer welfare? The following proposition gives a clear-cut answer.
Proposition 4. Whenever there is income inequality, health contribution competition leads to lower consumer expenditures and higher consumer welfare than premia competition.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition behind this result is simple: compared to premia competition, contribution rate competition shifts the focus of companies toward richer individuals because they are the more lucrative clients. However, these clients also react more sensitively on contribution rate increases. This renders health contribution competition fiercer: both companies moderate their claims in order not to put the high-income insurants off.
This intuition is easily substantiated by considering the relative strengths of extraction and erosion effects. Take the case of a degenerate income distribution (svc=0) as the starting point. For such a distribution, the distinction between premia and contribution competition is meaningless. So both modes of competition yield identical results, as can be seen by comparing (12) and (19) for svc=0.
Introducing income inequality by a mean-preserving spread of the income distribution has no effect on premia competition for neither extraction nor erosion effects are income-dependent. However, things are different with contribution rate competition. Whereas the extraction effect is proportional to mean income, the erosion effect is strictly convex in income. Hence, income inequality emphasizes the negative erosion effect relative to the positive rent effect. Therefore, insurance company profits must be lower under contribution rate competition whenever the income distribution is not degenerate. These lower profits translate into lower consumer expenditures. As contribution rate competition also reliefs poorer households, it also delivers higher consumer welfare.
EXTENSIONS
In this section, we discuss the robustness of the results with respect to three possible extensions.
Income Ceilings
Some countries limit public health insurance to a subset of the population. For example, in Germany only persons with an income below a threshold are mandatory members of public health insurance.
Our findings do not depend on the precise shape of the income distribution and would hence be reproduced with a distribution truncated by an income ceiling. Therefore, allowing for such a threshold would definitely not affect our results, unless there were spillovers in insurance company pricing decisions for persons above and below the ceiling. However, the only reason for spillovers we can think of would be average treatment cost that increase in the number of clients. This would affect pricing decisions both with and without ceilings. Still, the total number of (mandatory) clients would be fixed and the reaction of demand on premia and contribution rate changes would be the same as above. Therefore, the above results would still go through.
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Income-Related Risks
We have assumed that the risk of illness is the same for every person. However, one salient finding of the literature is that income and health are positively correlated (Van Ourti et al., 2009) . To the extent that this is not controlled for by a proper risk-adjustment system, the positive income-health nexus strengthens our results because it further increases the attractiveness of richer customers to insurance companies. For the sake of brevity, we consider only a setting without any risk-adjustment. The extension to partial risk adjustment is straightforward.
To be precise, let p(y) denote the probability of illness for a person with income y, with p 0 ðyÞ\0 and p ¼ R y y pðyÞf ðyÞdy as the average risk of illness. Leaving individual decision patterns unaltered, this modification affects insurance company profits. With health premia, the profit of company i amounts to:
Focussing directly on the switching cost set-up, we arrive at the first-order condition:
which in a symmetric equilibrium is solved by p ¼ p Á c þ 1 2Áz . For contribution rate competition, profit is:
R y y ½s i y À pðyÞ Á cd R i f ðyÞdy and the first-order condition with respect to s i becomes: 
with the symmetric solution:
Contribution rate competition leads to lower customer expenditures than premia competition when p>τl. This condition is tantamount to:
The left hand side of that expression is non-negative and positive whenever the income distribution is non-degenerate. The right hand side of (26) is nonpositive and is negative whenever illness risk decreases in incomesee the Appendix for details. Hence, the inequality in (26) holds and contribution rate competition is superior to premia competition. As stated above, this finding is rooted in an even more intense competition for high income earners for they are more likely to be net contributors for insurance companies.
Partial Insurance
The full insurance of risks assumed hitherto is typically prevented by problems of moral hazard. Although we will not engage in a detailed incorporation of asymmetric information to the model, we now consider a setting where not the full damage but only c<c is covered by health insurance. Again, we focus on the inertia case.
With premia competition, the person indifferent between company A and B has switching costk P , determined by:
While there is no closed-form solution fork P , we can easily state A's market share among persons with income y as:
where we concentrate on an interior solution, as must arise in a symmetric equilibrium, for the sake of brevity. This market share reacts on a premium increase according to : 
wherek R is the critical cost level for which indifference between both companies holds. This level is implicitly defined by:
and responds on a contribution rate increase according to @k R @s A ¼ y. Consequently, the reaction of A's market share remains income dependent:
and is more pronounced for high incomes for equal contribution rates. Imposing symmetry on the first-order condition:
gives: Z y y y 2 f ðyÞdy À Z y y ½sy À p Á cz Á yf ðyÞdy 0;
the solution to which is analogous to (19):
Partial insurance has no structural effect on equilibrium premia and contribution rates in our model. Hence, the comparison of consumer expenditures yields results identical to the case of full insurance.
CONCLUSION
The analysis has shown that health insurance competition via contribution rates can be fiercer than via premia. This result stands in contrast to popular conjectures in the literature and in public debate.
Simple as it is, the model should not be misinterpreted such that contribution rates are definitely preferable to premia. A number of aspects, which may tilt the balance in favor of premia, like the eradication of implicit income taxation have not been incorporated to the analysis. However, as many studies find those aspects to be of mixed importance, the decision over contribution rates versus premia as financing instruments for healthcare appears more delicate than presumed. Maybe the most robust policy recommendation would be to aim at reducing switching cost, as this would render competition aspects irrelevant for the question how to raise health insurance revenues.
Other features neglected in the analysis are income related risk-adjustment schemes, quality differentiation between suppliers and private coinsurance. However, the significance of these points varies among countries. The income level of the insured is relevant for risk adjustment in Germany but not in the Netherlands and Switzerland. While public healthcare services are tightly standardized in Switzerland, Germany allows health insurance companies to compete in both price and quality. In a model allowing for these features, we expect the income-dependency of risk aversion to have an important bearing on the findings. While we conjecture that our results go through when risk aversion is sufficiently low and not too decreasing in income, we leave a fully-fledged analysis for future work.
One final important point the model fails to address are differences in perceptions of contribution rates and premia. Advocates of the latter often argue that premia have a higher visibility for customers and thus improve demand reactivity. Taking this point seriously would definitely require a behavioral framework going beyond the standard microeconomic approach pursued here. This is also a interesting topic for future research.
Proof of Proposition 4 To prove that contribution rate competition implies lower consumer expenditures, it is sufficient to compare company revenues. These revenues amount tosl andp, respectively. Contribution rate competition is superior to premia competition, if and only ifp [sl which is definitely fulfilled when svc [ 1 2ÁzÁpÁc . For svc 1 2ÁzÁpÁc , we have:
Consumer welfare is higher under contribution rate competition as consumer expenditures are lower in total and more progressively distributed than under premia competition.
Income dependent risks
To show that the right hand side of (26) is negative when illness risk and income are negatively correlated, we employ the following Lemma which is due to Eaton and Rosen (1980) . 
if Θ(y) is uniformly decreasing.
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Let a ¼ y; b ¼ y; y Ã ¼ l; hðyÞ ¼ p À pðyÞ, such that the required properties and (33) hold. Let Θ(y)=Ày, so the left hand side of (34) coincides with the right hand side of (26). As H 0 ðyÞ\0, this right hand side must be negative according to the Lemma.
